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A recent survey of approximately 700 hospital executives con-
ducted by Ernst & Whinney indicated that one-third of the hospi-
tals they represented were already involved in at least one joint
venture and sixty-four percent were interested in pursuing joint
ventures. Nearly forty percent of the existing joint ventures were
ambulatory care facility joint ventures. Thirty percent of the re-
spondents expressed interest in alternative delivery systems, with
sixteen percent already involved in health maintenance organiza-
tions and preferred provider arrangements. Other respondents
were involved in other types of joint ventures, including medical
office buildings, clinical laboratories, laundry facilities and sub-
stance-abuse programs. Almost half of the respondents indicated
that "most" of their competitors were involved in joint ventures
and ninety-eight percent thought that there will be more joint ven-
tures in the future.'
Health care providers are entering joint ventures for numerous
reasons, including:
* Generation of income from existing and new sources
* Controlling competition
* Creating and maintaining relationships between medical staff and
hospital
* Retaining present patients and expanding the number of new patients
* Providing tax shelters
* Enhancing access to capital
* Creating economies of scale
* B.A., 1967, Yale University; J.D., 1974, University of Virginia School of Law. Partner
in the law firm of Ropes & Gray, Boston, Massachusetts.
** B.A., 1967, Harvard University; J.D., 1973, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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* Sharing costs and financial risks and rewards
* Providing management expertise.
Joint ventures have been structured to undertake a variety of
types of projects with a number of different types of participants.
The participants include physicians, hospitals and proprietary cor-
porations. In addition to ambulatory care centers and alternative
delivery systems, joint venture projects include commercial real es-
tate developments, clinical laboratories, shared service ventures,
nursing homes, life care communities, radiology facilities and home
health care sales and services. The various types of ventures and
the variety of participants create a series of legal issues, the most
significant of which are the subject of this article. After discussing
in general terms the organizational formats which may be used for
a joint venture, this article discusses the following legal issues: cer-
tificate of need, corporate practice of medicine, fraud and abuse,
tax, antitrust, employee benefit plans, labor and employment mat-
ters and securities laws. In several instances, these issues have
been examined in the context of their impact upon joint ventures
in specific health care activities, including alternative delivery sys-
tems and home health care joint ventures.
II. JOINT VENTURE CHARACTERISTICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMATS
It is important that joint venturers share a common understand-
ing of the term "joint venture". The term "joint venture" does not
define a specific type of legal entity-instead, it refers to a rela-
tionship which has certain characteristics and which may take a
number of different forms. The characteristics include: (1) a rela-
tionship which is formed to accomplish a certain goal and is lim-
ited in scope to those activities necessary to carry out that goal, (2)
contributions-in some form or another-by each venturer to the
enterprise, (3) a joint interest in the enterprise, (4) a sharing of
profits and losses, and (5) a sharing of decision-making and right
of control.
A number of organizational formats can be utilized to accom-
plish the goals of a joint venture. The most common formats are
general and limited partnerships, for-profit and not-for-profit cor-
porations, and contractual relationships. Although tax considera-
tions often call for the formation of a partnership, each of these
organizational formats involves distinct characteristics which must
be evaluated in light of a joint venture's purposes.
A general partnership is recognized under common law as an as-
sociation of two or more persons engaged in business for profit.
The relationship between the general partners is governed by a
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written partnership agreement and typically a state general part-
nership statute which follows the Uniform Partnership Act. The
partnership agreement should address such matters as: initial and
further capital contributions by the partners; remedies for a part-
ner's failure to contribute; allocation of profits and losses; distribu-
tion of cash flow; management resolution in the event of deadlock
between the managing partners; contracts with related parties; in-
come tax components; the transfer of interest in the venture; and
events of dissolution.
The general partnership is a pass through device for tax pur-
poses. Thus, if the venture incurs losses or gives rise to substantial
deductions in its initial years, the general partners will be able to
recognize such losses or take such deductions to offset their income
from other sources, provided, of course, that they are taxable enti-
ties. On the other hand, general partners are jointly and severally
liable for the obligations of the partnership. Each general partner
is expected to participate in the management and control of the
venture. If a general partner remains passive, the securities laws
may become applicable.
2
A limited partnership is a partnership which is organized under
a state's limited partnership statute and which has at least one
general partner and one limited partner. The general partner is
fully liable for partnership obligations while the limited partners
are liable only to the extent of their investment. The control of the
limited partnership typically resides with the general partner. The
limited partners are not able to participate in control or manage-
ment decisions without jeopardizing their limited liability, except
in the case of certain actions specifically enumerated in the appli-
cable limited partnership statute.
Another possibility for the venturers is to carry out their joint
venture through a corporate structure. The venturers would either
own stock in a for-profit corporation, or be the members of a chari-
table, nonprofit corporation. Among the advantages to utilizing a
corporate structure to carry out the purposes of the joint venture is
the existence of a fairly clear and well established body of law gov-
erning corporations. More importantly, however, corporate law
provides for limited liability for stockholders and members of the
corporation as long as adequate capitalization exists and corporate
formalities are respected. In addition to being protected from per-
sonal liability, stockholders or members are further protected in
2. See infra note 146.
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that no one stockholder or member can bind the others in matters
involving day-to-day business operations.
If only individuals are to be involved in the joint venture as
shareholders, then a Subchapter S corporation may be used. A
Subchapter S corporation is a corporation which is treated in a
manner similar to a partnership for some federal income tax pur-
poses. The corporation is not treated as a separate taxable entity,
but rather the income and losses of the corporation are treated as
directly incurred by the shareholders. Typically, an S corporation
is taxed, however, as a separate entity for state income tax
purposes.
The advantage of an S corporation is that it offers many of the
tax advantages of a partnership while limiting the liability of the
participants to the extent of the assets of the corporation (assum-
ing the corporation is adequately capitalized and corporate formal-
ities are observed). The major disadvantage is that the amount of
deduction which a shareholder can take with respect to an S corpo-
ration is limited to the amount of capital the shareholder either
contributed or loaned to the S corporation. In this regard, an S
corporation should be contrasted to a partnership in which a part-
ner's deductions may exceed the amount of his contributions to the
partnership where, for example, the deductions are attributable to
real estate purchased with non-recourse financing.
While a contractual arrangement between joint venturers is a
readily familiar mechanism for creating a relationship, it is not a
favored approach for joint venturers because in many situations
courts will treat the contractual relationship as a general partner-
ship. Therefore, it is more advantageous to create a general part-
nership using a written agreement so that an accepted body of
common law interpreting the general partners' relationship is
available.
III. LEGAL ISSUES
A. Certificate of Need Requirements
Most states have a certificate of need program requiring an ap-
plicant which is a health care facility or is deemed part of a health
care facility to obtain a certificate of need from a particular state
agency in two circumstances: (1) when it is making a health care
related expenditure in excess of a specified statutory amount, and
Vol. 24:455
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(2) when it is involved in a "substantial change of service". 3
When a joint venture is undertaken, the hospital corporation, in
order to protect its assets should the joint venture not succeed, will
usually not be the joint venturer. Instead, the corporation under-
taking the joint venture will be a "sister" corporation of the hospi-
tal corporation as both the hospital and the sister corporation will
be controlled by a common parent corporation. The legal issue
which arises in this context is whether the involvement of the sis-
ter corporation will enable the venturers to avoid the requirement
of a certificate of need for the joint venture. It is possible that the
state regulatory agency will argue that the common parent rela-
tionship in and of itself will make the joint venture "part of" a
health care facility, namely the hospital, and that therefore a cer-
tificate of need will be required if the hospital itself would have
been required to obtain a certificate of need had it been the joint
venturer. While this argument should not succeed if corporate for-
malities have been observed, such arguments by state agencies
should be anticipated.
4
In determining whether a project is "part of" a health care facil-
ity and hence whether a certificate of need is required, the state
regulatory agency looks to such factors as whether the project is
legally, administratively, financially, physically and, in terms of its
services, so intertwined with the particular health care facility that
it would be appropriate to view it functionally as part of that facil-
ity. As tests for such a functional relationship, the state regulatory
agency inquires into whether (1) the facility will be constructed by
a corporation which is not a health care facility; (2) the ownership
of the facility will be in the name of a health care facility; (3) a
corporation other than a health care facility will assume responsi-
bility for the control of the operation, maintenance and adminis-
tration of the facility; (4) a corporation other than a health care
facility will be the truly necessary party to the business arrange-
3. A "substantial change of service" is typically defined as an addition of a service
which entails: annual operating costs in excess of a stated amount; an increase in bed capac-
ity beyond a specific number of beds; an addition of a major service to those available at a
health care facility or satellite clinic or unit thereof; the establishment of a unit of a facility;
the establishment of a unit or service of a facility off the premises of the health care facility;
or any increase in licensed bed capacity of a facility or service unit of the facility. A substan-
tial change of service need not involve a health care related expenditure in excess of the
statutory amount. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t14 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 42 C.F.R.
§§ 121.1-123.608 (1985).
4. District of Columbia v. Washington Hosp. Center Health System, No. 6970-83
(App. D.C. Oct. 5, 1983)(settlement agreement).
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ments; (5) at the conclusion of the business arrangement, the
health care facility will own the facility or will have the option to
purchase the facility; (6) the facility will be on the health care fa-
cility's campus; and (7) the construction and operation of the facil-
ity will involve any guarantees or subsidies by the health care
facility.
The creation of an ambulatory care center by a joint venture
comprised of a sister corporation of a hospital and a group of doc-
tors provides an example of how a situation might be analyzed
under the certificate of need laws. In this example, a partnership
will be created between the doctors and a sister corporation of a
hospital to purchase space in which to conduct the ambulatory
care center program. The physicians will provide the medical ser-
vices in the facility under a lease from the partnership. Another
corporation affiliated with the hospital will provide administrative
services, such as scheduling appointments for the physicians.
Neither the hospital nor its parent corporation will guarantee any
loans for the construction of the facility.
In the context of this example, the ambulatory care facility
should not be deemed "part of" a health care facility under the
tests set forth above for the following reasons: (1) it will not be
constructed by a health care facility; (2) a non-health care facility
will own the space; (3) a non-health care facility (i.e. the physi-
cians) will control the operation, maintenance and administration
of the space; (4) a non-health care facility will be the truly neces-
sary party to the business arrangements; (5) the hospital will not
own the space or have the option to purchase the space at the con-
clusion of the business arrangements; and (6) the hospital will not
subsidize or guarantee the program. Accordingly, a certificate of
need should not be required for this type of joint venture.
B. The Corporate Practice of Medicine
Many joint ventures, including those involving physicians, sup-
plant or supplement the traditional role played by physicians.
Generally, statutes authorizing the formation of corporations to
carry on any lawful business do not authorize the formation of cor-
porations for the purpose of practicing medicine.5 Furthermore,
physician licensing statutes provide that unlicensed persons may
not engage in the practice of medicine. A corporation cannot ob-
5. People ex rel Kerner v. United Medical Serv. Inc., 362 Ill. 442, 456, 200 N.E. 157,
164 (1936). See also United States v. Kitner, 216 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1954).
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tain a license to engage in the practice of medicine because it can-
not meet the license requirements such as age, education, and high
moral standards. 6 Therefore, any corporation engaged in the prac-
tice of medicine is subject to liability under a state's physician li-
censing statute.7
The basis for the corporate practice of medicine doctrine has
been the courts' determination that the association of a corpora-
tion with the learned professions is against public policy. This de-
termination is based upon the belief that corporate considerations
would intrude upon the highly confidential physician-patient
relationship.8
Even though all jurisdictions agree that a corporation cannot ob-
tain a license to practice medicine, they do not agree on the issue
of whether a corporation is practicing medicine by employing or
exercising control over licensed practitioners. Many states, includ-
ing New York and California, hold that a corporation is illegally
engaged in the practice of medicine if it employs qualified licensed
physicians to perform the medical services.9 Courts have also ap-
plied the doctrine when a corporation does not directly employ
physicians, but merely places them on an approved list and com-
pensates them on a fee for service basis rather than by a salary
arrangement. In People ex rel. State Board of Medical Examiners
v. Pacific Health Corporation,10 the California Supreme Court
held that the policy of the doctrine may not be circumvented by
"technical distinctions in the manner in which the doctors are en-
6. See Dr. Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Allison, 360 Ill. 638, 641-42, 196 N.E. 799, 800
(1935). "To practice a profession requires something more than the financial ability to hire
competent persons to do the actual work. It can be done only by a duly qualified human
being, and to qualify something more than mere knowledge or skill is essential. The qualifi-
cations include personal characteristics, such as honesty, guided by an upright conscience
and a sense of loyalty to clients or patients, even to the extent of sacrificing pecuniary
profit, if necessary .... No corporation can qualify."
7. See People v. John H. Woodberry Dermatological Institute, 192 N.Y. 454, 85 N.E.
697, 698 (1908).
8. See Garcia v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 F. Supp. 434, 440 (W.D.
Tex. 1974), aff'd mem., 421 U.S. 995 (1975), in which the court asked: "To whom does the
doctor owe his first duty-the patient or corporation? Who is to preserve the confidential
nature of the doctor-patient relationship? What is to prevent or who is to control a private
corporation from engaging in mass media advertising in the exaggerated fashion so familiar
to every American? Who is to dictate the medical and administrative procedures to be fol-
lowed? Where do budget considerations end and patient care begin?" 384 F. Supp. at 440.
9. See New York v. Abortion Information Agency, Inc., 37 A.D.2d 142, 330 N.Y.S.2d
927 (1971); People ex rel. State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal. 2d
156, 158, 82 P.2d 429, 430 (1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939).
10. 12 Cal. 2d 156, 82 P.2d 429 (1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939).
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gaged, designated or compensated by the corporation."'" A minor-
ity of jurisdictions hold, however, that a corporation may contract
with physicians to furnish medical treatment. 2
Many courts have selectively applied the doctrine. For instance,
in People ex rel. State Board of Medical Examiners v. Pacific
Health Corporation, the California Supreme Court distinguished
for-profit and not-for-profit corporations and stated that its ruling
was not intended to prohibit charitable, cooperative corporations
from providing health care services.' 3 The court based this distinc-
tion on the public policy notion that interference with the physi-
cian-patient relationship and "commercialization" of the practice
of medicine is most likely to arise when the physician is employed
or supervised by a profit-seeking entity.14 The federal district court
in Group Health Association v. Moor15 held that a group of indi-
viduals may incorporate as a nonprofit corporation and contract
with a physician for medical services for a stipulated period at
fixed compensation without violating the District of Columbia's
physician licensing statute. Importantly, the court reasoned that
the "physicians ... are rather in the position of independent con-
tractors, and the plaintiff does not in any way undertake to control
the manner in which they attend or prescribe for their patients."' 6
In addition to the selective application of the corporate practice
of medicine doctrine, the doctrine itself appears to be in decline.
Only one court has applied the doctrine in recent years. In Garcia
v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners,7 the federal district
court held that a nonprofit corporation formed for the purpose of
providing medical care to low income groups through salaried phy-
sicians could constitute the illegal corporate practice of medicine.'
11. 12 Cal. 2d at 158, 82 P.2d at 439.
12. State v. Lewin, 128 Mo. App. 149, 106 S.W. 581 (1907) (a corporation formed for
the purpose of furnishing medical and surgical treatment has the power to contract with
physicians who render the medical and surgical services); State Electro-Medical Institute v.
State, 74 Neb. 40, 43, 103 N.W. 1078, 1079 (1905) ("Making contracts is not practicing
medicine. Collecting the compensation therefore is not practicing medicine, within the
meaning of this statute. No professional qualifications are requisite for doing these things").
13. 12 Cal. 2d at 159-60, 82 P.2d at 431.
14. Id. See Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497,
539-40 (1981).
15. 24 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1938), affd sub noma. Jordon v. Group Health Assoc., 107
F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
16. 24 F. Supp. at 446; See also Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Reliev-
ing the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARV. L. REV. 887, 961 (1971).
17. 384 F. Supp. 434 (W.D. Tex. 1974), affd mem., 421 U.S. 995 (1975).
18. 384 F. Supp. at 440.
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The court based its decision, however, on a Texas statute which
only authorizes licensed physicians to form a nonprofit corporation
organized for the purpose of delivering health care if the trustees
of the corporation are persons duly licensed to practice medicine., e
Furthermore, some state legislatures have expressly overruled
the common law prohibition against the corporate practice of
medicine by enacting comprehensive statutes which allow the for-
mation of corporations for the purpose of delivering health care
services. In 1979, the Illinois legislature enacted the Medical Cor-
poration Act20 authorizing the formation of corporations "for the
study, diagnosis and treatment of human ailments and injuries,"
thus overruling People ex rel. Kerner v. United Medical Service,
Inc.2" which held that Illinois law prohibited corporations from
practicing medicine.2
3
Finally, some states have selectively overruled the common law
prohibition by enacting statutes which allow certain corporate
forms to provide health care services. Those corporate forms most
often include charitable hospital corporations, nonprofit health
service corporations (Blue Cross/Blue Shield), professional corpo-
rations and health maintenance organizations.
The risk of vulnerability under this doctrine may be reduced in a
joint venture by taking one or more of the following actions: (1)
forming a nonprofit corporation; (2) forming a corporation whose
directors or trustees are health care providers; (3) forming a corpo-
ration which independently contracts with, rather than employs,
physicians; or (4) forming a corporation which does not accept the
fee for a physician's services.
C. Medicare and Medicaid Prohibitions on Fraud and Abuse
One of the major concerns of health care providers entering into
joint ventures is the potential for violation of the Medicare24 and
Medicaid 25 prohibitions on fraud and abuse. The federal statutes
provide that whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives
any remuneration (including a kickback) for referring an individ-
19. Id. at 438.
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 631-648 (1984).
21. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 632 (1984).
22. 362 Il1. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936).
23. Id. at 454, 200 N.E. at 163. See Real v. Kim, 112 Ill. App. 3d 427, 436, 445 N.E.2d
783, 790 (1983).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395zz (1982 & Supp. I 1983).
25. 42 U.S.C. 99 1396-1396zz (1982 & Supp. I 1983).
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ual for the furnishing of items or services reimbursed under Medi-
care or Medicaid or for purchasing (leasing, etc.) or arranging for
the purchasing (leasing, etc.) of any good, service or item reim-
bursed under Medicare or Medicaid shall be guilty of a felony. Of-
fering or paying the remuneration is similarly a felony. The broad
language of the statutes is partially limited by express exemptions
for discounts which are properly disclosed and reflected in costs
claimed or charges made by the provider and for compensation
paid by employers to employees for providing covered services.2"
As originally conceived, the Medicare antifraud and abuse
prohibitions were designed to deter unethical and unlawful prac-
tices which resulted in increased costs to the Medicare and Medi-
caid programs. "Classic" referral schemes discussed in case law in-
cluded gifts of alcoholic beverages in exchange for nursing home
pharmacy business 27 and kickbacks to physicians for sending sam-
ples for testing to certain laboratories.2 8 Even in these relatively
straightforward early cases, troubling issues were raised as to the
broad scope of the statute. Arguments that payments were at least
in part for services, or that the actual cost to the Medicare system
was not increased, did not prevail. In United States v. Rut-
tenberg,9 the court noted that the proscribed arrangement not
only had the potential for increasing costs but also for masking
possible government price reductions and encouraging the provi-
sion of unnecessary services and supplies.30 The courts in both
Ruttenberg and United States v. Hancock"1 appeared strongly in-
fluenced by the fact that a party in a position to "open up" or
"control" federal funds had received payments for exercising its
judgment in a certain fashion.32 Other decided cases confirmed
that payments for referrals, in conjunction with services of a mini-
mal nature, might violate the statute.3
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(1),(2) & (3) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b)(1),(2) & (3)(1982).
27. United States v. Perlstein, 632 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1084
(1981).
28. United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991
(1979).
29. 625 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1980).
30. Id. at 177 n.9.
31. 604 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979).
32. 625 F.2d at 176-77; 604 F.2d at 1002. United States v. Hancock cited a frequently
reiterated definition of a "kickback": "'a percentage payment ... for granting assistance by
one in a position to open up or control a source of income.. ' WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966) . . ." 604 F.2d at 1002.
33. See United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d Ill (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
952 (1980), and cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980), where for example, the defendant labora-
Vol. 24:455
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Some of the fact patterns addressed by the courts have been
fairly complex. In United States v. Universal Trade and Indus-
tries, Inc.,4 the court upheld a conviction against Universal, a
large medical laboratory, which had been approached by the ad-
ministrator of a medical clinic "looking for a new laboratory to do
his clinic's laboratory tests."3 5 Universal agreed to set up a labora-
tory in a small room at the clinic, at no cost to the clinic. It was
further agreed that the administrative director of Universal would
handle all administrative matters for this laboratory, including
personnel. The lab would do simple tests on-site and send compli-
cated tests to Universal. Once established, the lab would be owned
by a separate corporation. While the clinic would not have invested
any money, it would own stock in the corporation. The clinic own-
ers were to be further remunerated by receiving a percentage of
profits, and its director was to be paid a percentage of gross reve-
nues as an administrative salary.3 6 Despite the attempt to charac-
terize the payments as "administrative fees," and the plan to pro-
vide an equity interest for the physician owners, the scheme was
successfully challenged as violative of the Medicaid statute. Key
facts cited by the court included the lack of a contribution by the
clinic for the stock of the on-site laboratory and the non-perform-
ance of administrative duties by the director.3 7
In a recent case, United States v. Greber,s8 Dr. A. Alvin Greber,
tory was alleged to have made payments, labeled "consulting fees," to doctors (1) to induce
them to send laboratory work to the defendant, (2) to cause them to form a corporation to
allow doctors to gain an ownership interest in defendant, and (3) to cause them to encourage
other doctors to send their lab work to defendant. Defendants challenged the sufficiency of
the government's information under which they were charged, to establish a crime under 42
U.S.C. § 1396n(b), and challenged the vagueness of the statute itself. According to the infor-
mation, the work had been performed and the billing was in accordance with Medicaid stat-
utes and regulations. Nonetheless, because the payments were acknowledged to be at least
in part for referrals, they were sufficient to constitute illegal kickbacks under even the less
specific language of the pre-1977 version of 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b). According to the court,
Congress, in 1977, amended 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b) "so as to remove any possible doubt that
conduct such as that involved in the present case violates the Act." (footnote omitted) 625
F.2d at 113.
34. 695 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1983).
35. Id. at 1152.
36. Id.
37. Id. Cf. Tanquilut v. Illinois Dep't of Public Aid, 78 Ill. App. 3d 55, 396 N.E.2d
1126 (1979), where the court overturned an administrative finding adverse to a physician
practice which leased space in its building to a pharmacy. The court determined that the
agency had not adduced sufficient evidence that the rental fee, based in part on a percent-
age of gross receipts, was excessive, nor shown evidence of patient steering or excessive pre-
scription practices.
38. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985).
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Chairman of Internal Medicine at Philadelphia's Metropolitan
Hospital Parkview Division, was convicted by a jury in the U.S.
District Court in Philadelphia on federal charges of fraud, making
false statements on Medicare documents, and paying kickbacks to
physicians to increase sales at Cardio-Med, a medical equipment
company he owned. The facts, much simplified, were as follows:
Cardio-Med billed Medicare for performing Holter Monitor tests,
as ordered by a patient's physician. Cardio-Med, in turn, paid the
referring physician for interpreting the results of the monitoring. 9
The government took a very aggressive stance in regard to the
legal basis for a conviction under the fraud and abuse statutes. Ac-
cording to the government's trial memorandum, even if it were
true, as defendant asserted, that Cardio-Med paid a reasonable fee
for actual services, i.e., interpretation of Holter Monitor tests, the
fact that the physicians rendered the services would be an insuffi-
cient defense under the antifraud and abuse statutes:
The same evil remains even if the physician actually performs a service for
the remuneration or kickback that would have been properly compensable
from Medicare funds if it had been billed directly by the physician to Medi-
care .... Even assuming that the doctor did the interpretation, this still
has the pernicious effect of leaving the physician under a financial incentive
to overutilize the Holter Monitor services, while insulating him from ac-
countability for his actions since only Cardio-Med, and not the physician, is
on record with Medicare as having billed for the service.4 0
The Third Circuit recently affirmed the district court's decision,
stating that "if one purpose of the payment was to induce future
referrals, the Medicare statute has been violated.""'
In addition to case law, guidance as to the application of the
antifraud and abuse provisions of the Medicare and Medicaid laws
can be found in letters issued by the Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration (HCFA), the federal agency charged with enforcement
of the statute. HCFA has taken the position in several letters, for
example, that any agreement in which a physician agrees to refer
his patients exclusively to one hospital would violate the statute."
39. Id. at 69-70.
40. Brief for Government at 15-16, United States v. Greber, No. 83-00414 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
41. 760 F.2d at 69.
42. Letter from Martin L. Kappert to Regional Administrator in Atlanta (Jan. 8,
1980)(information on 1977 Fraud and Abuse Amendments); Letter from Irv. Cohen, Deputy
Director-Office of Program Validation-Bureau of Quality Control (Mar. 18, 1980)(clarifi-
cation of HCFA interpretation of illegal remuneration provisions of Medicare-Medicaid
Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments).
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For example, in the letter dated March 18, 1980, HCFA wrote:
We agree. . . that, while the physician's income is not directly tied to the
number of admissions provided the hospital, payment of any remuneration
in exchange for an exclusive referral agreement with the hospital would
seem to be prohibited under the language of section 1877(b)."'
Even in the absence of an express referral requirement, a risk of
an antifraud and abuse charge may arise if a course of conduct
develops whereby a provider routinely and exclusively refers all of
its patients in need of services to one entity. If such a course of
conduct exists, HCFA might argue the existence of an implied ex-
clusive referral contract, and initiate enforcement proceedings.
In addition to addressing general issues involving physician re-
muneration and practices, HCFA has commented on so-called
"finder's fees" paid by durable medical equipment (DME) suppli-
ers to health care professionals who are in a position to direct pa-
tients to particular suppliers. Intermediary Letter, No. B-85-2,
April, 1985"" was purportedly issued in response to questions re-
ceived by HCFA in regard to payments received by health care
professionals in a position to direct patients needing DME to par-
ticular suppliers. In this Letter, HCFA addressed the referral of
patients by respiratory therapists. Therapists who had referred pa-
tients would receive a fee from the supplier for setting up the nec-
essary equipment, instructing the patient in the use of the equip-
ment, or performing monthly maintenance on the equipment. The
Letter states that these payments to therapists might constitute a
violation of the fraud and abuse provisions if "intended to induce
the referral of patients to the suppliers." Even if the respiratory
therapist performs services, the arrangement will be analyzed to
see if all or some of the payment is intended to induce a referral
rather than compensate for services.
The Letter indicates that such arrangements will be reviewed on
a case-by-case basis. However, HCFA may consider the following
factors, among others, in evaluating whether a payment is, in ef-
fect, a prohibited referral fee, or "kickback":
[W]hether the therapist provides services to the DME supplier only for
those patients which he refers, whether the supplier uses therapists to in-
stall and service equipment for patients not referred by therapists, whether
43. Letter from Irv. Cohen (Mar. 18, 1980).
44. Program Memo. to Carriers, No. B-85-2, Medicare/Medicaid: Finders and Refer-




there are unusual geographic or medical reasons for using therapists in cer-
tain areas, and how similar equipment is installed and maintained by other
suppliers in the area.
45
The reasoning of this Letter would seem to apply to any party hav-
ing control or influence over patient referrals, including employees
of a non-institutional provider and a provider itself. While there
may be arguments that the Intermediary Letter should be inter-
preted strictly and limited to its facts, the Letter makes it clear
that payments for services will be carefully scrutinized. Even if the
fee is reasonable, such payments will, according to HCFA, violate
the law if they are made for patient referrals.
As should be clear from the discussion of the case law and inter-
pretations by the government of the antifraud and abuse provi-
sions, these statutes pose real problems for entities interested in
joint venturing. Because of the breadth of the statute and the gov-
ernment's aggressive approach, as well as the uncertainty as to how
the statutes will be applied to joint enterprises, there can be no
guarantees that participation by several entities in a health care
venture will not violate the antifraud and abuse provisions of
Medicare and Medicaid.
More specifically, if a contractual arrangement is to be used, spe-
cial care should be exercised. For example, if a visiting nurse asso-
ciation (VNA) contracts to provide services to. a supplier, the
agreement should be non-exclusive. The VNA must be free to refer
patients to any supplier, as appropriate. Furthermore, the supplier
must be free to utilize other nursing agencies to render services to
the patient when that is appropriate. At the same time, the VNA
must provide services to a range of patients, including patients re-
ferred to the supplier by physicians, not simply those patients with
whom the VNA has had initial contact. The contract should spec-
ify that in all instances the patient chooses the supplier, and the
actual operation of the arrangement must reflect that contract pro-
vision. In other words, patients.must be given a real opportunity to
exercise choice of supplier, and payment for services to profession-
als must not take place prior to patient choice and must not be
contingent upon patient choice. Special care should be taken that
VNA's are not paid by suppliers for services which are already pro-
vided by a hospital, and which are part of its "rate" (e.g., discharge
45. Id. See also Intermediary Letter, No. B-84-9, Payments to Respiratory Therapists
by Durable Medical Equipment Suppliers and the Illegal Remuneration Provisions of the





The services that are provided through a contractual arrange-
ment must be provided to patients regardless of referral source.
The services provided must be medically necessary, and strong
utilization review should be present. The fees that are paid by a
supplier to a service entity must be reasonable in light of the ser-
vices that are in fact rendered. The parties contracting must un-
derstand that they will have to be prepared to show that the ar-
rangement does not increase charges to the patients or costs to the
Medicare and Medicaid system; fundamentally, they must be able
to show that the payments are not for patient referrals.
Carrying out a joint venture through a partnership appears to
provide more protection from successful prosecution under the an-
tifraud and abuse provisions, although again, there can be no guar-
antees. Under the partnership arrangement, a new supplier or pro-
vider is created to compete independently with other suppliers/
providers for business. There are no longer two entities, one of
which can be characterized as referring to the other, but a single
entity representing a joint investment by two parties. To
strengthen this legal distinction, however, the parties should form
a bona fide partnership which would engage in a genuine business
venture, with each partner sharing in distributions based solely on
each partner's proportionate contribution to the partnership and
not on volume of business or number of patients. Each partner
should be at risk for its pro rata share of all losses suffered by the
joint venture in proportion to their respective ownership interests.
It is helpful if parties with a "captured" patient base, such as
hospitals, do not participate directly. In other words, if a reorga-
nized hospital system is interested in, for example, home health
care, it is advantageous for the home care venture to be carried out
through an affiliate of the hospital and not the hospital itself. In
addition, of course, the hospital corporation must not receive any
payments that could be characterized as kickbacks for referring its
patients to the venture entity. Even in this situation, there is no
guarantee that the government would not attempt to look through
the affiliate to the provider entity and view a partnership distribu-
tion to the affiliate as an "indirect" payment to the related party
made to induce a referral.
If one partner is a hospital affiliate, there should be no require-
ment, explicit or implicit, and no increased remuneration, for the
hospital to refer any patients to the partnership's joint venture.
Patients discharged from the hospital should be presented with re-
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alistic options for obtaining supplies and services from a variety of
sources. Furthermore, the partnership should not limit its market-
ing efforts to patients discharged from the hospital.
D. Tax Issues
While most joint ventures will not seek a determination of tax-
exempt status, obtaining tax-exempt status for a joint venture may
be possible depending on the venture's purposes. In general, a hos-
pital shared service consortium does not qualify under section
501(c)(3) 46 for tax exemption,4 7 unless it satisfies one of the three
following narrow exceptions:
(i) The consortium members are related entities, i.e., part of a single tax
exempt parent-subsidiary group;48
(ii) The consortium conducts substantive programs that the Service regards
as inherently exempt in nature such that the organization independently
qualifies for exemption under the "charitable, educational, scientific" crite-
ria of section 501(c)(3), e.g., a research laboratory operated in conjunction
with the teaching program(s) of one or more member hospitals;49 or
(iii) The consortium provides services to exempt organizations in a situation
where the services are not otherwise commercially available 0 or provides
the services at or below cost."
If a shared service consortium will not satisfy any of these nar-
row exceptions, the joint venture corporation must be organized
and operated in accordance with the requirements of section
501(e) 52 to be eligible for tax-exemption. Section 501(e) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code was enacted to allow tax-exempt hospitals to
join together to provide certain specified, ostensibly commercial
services on a cooperative basis free from federal taxation. 53 For ex-
ample, a joint venture formed by several hospitals to provide labo-
ratory or diagnostic imaging services may seek to qualify for fed-
eral tax-exemption under this section. A hospital shared service
consortium satisfying the organizational and operational require-
ments of section 501(e) will be deemed a "charitable" organization
under section 501(c)(3) and may be eligible for foundation classifi-
46. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
47. I.R.C. § 502(a).
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b).
49. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8230002.
50. Cf. id.
51. See Rev. Rul. 71-529, 1971-2 C.B. 234. See also Rev. Rul. 72-369, 1972-2 C.B. 245;
G.C.M. 38987 (Feb. 13, 1983).
52. I.R.C. § 501(e).
53. See HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1981).
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cation under sections 509(a)(1)"4 and 170(b)(1)(a)(iii)5 5 as a pub-
licly supported organization by virtue of its contributions, under
section 509(a)(2) as publicly supported by virtue of its earned in-
come or under section 509(a)(3)56 as a supporting organization.
More likely as part of a reorganized hospital system, a tax-ex-
empt corporation will be formed to engage in a joint venture with
for-profit entities. Among the issues that might be raised by this
scenario are: (1) whether the new corporation would qualify for
tax-exempt status; (2) whether entering into a partnership with a
for-profit entity would threaten the tax-exempt status of the new
corporation; and (3) whether some of its activities would generate
unrelated business taxable income (UBTI).57
To qualify for exemption, the new corporation would have to
satisfy both an organizational and operational test. To meet the
organizational test, the corporate purposes of the new corporation,
as stated in its articles of organization, would have to be limited to
exempt purposes, e.g., charitable, educational or scientific pur-
poses.58 The operational test may be divided into three major
parts: (1) the primary activity test, which precludes the corpora-
tion from conducting a substantial part of its activities for non-
exempt purposes;59 (2) the trade or business test, which precludes
exempt status if a primary activity of the corporation is the con-
duct of an unrelated trade or business (defined as a business the
conduct of which is not "substantially related" to the exercise or
performance by such organization of the purpose or function con-
stituting the basis for its exemption);60 and (3) the private benefit
test, which requires that the net earnings of the corporation not
inure to the private benefit of non-exempt entities.61
Assuming that, at least initially, the new corporation's primary
activity would be its participation in the joint venture by means of
a partnership, and its primary source of income would be distribu-
tions from the partnership's net profits, the new corporation would
have to demonstrate that (1) its activities on behalf of the partner-
ship are consistent with its exempt purposes, and (2) that the part-
54. I.R.C. § 5 09(a)(1).
55. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(a)(iii).
56. I.R.C. § 5 09(a)(3).
57. I.R.C. § 513.
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b).
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).
60. Id.
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).
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nership business is "substantially related" to the performance of
the new corporation's exempt purposes. For example, to the extent
the new corporation would be responsible for the supervision of
the clinical and educational services provided by the partnership,
it could argue that its activities on behalf of the partnership were
consistent with its exempt purposes. Furthermore, to demonstrate
that the partnership business is "substantially related" to the new
corporation's performance of its exempt purposes, it would be im-
portant to stress the clinical and educational component of the
venture and to be able to differentiate the partnership business
from the purely commercial activities of the non-exempt venturer.
Another hurdle to be overcome would be the private benefit test.
For many years, the IRS appeared unwilling to deviate from the
general rule that participation of an exempt entity as a general
partner in a partnership with a for-profit corporation was inconsis-
tent with tax-exempt status.6 This rule has been relaxed recently
with regard to joint ventures involving medical office buildings and
radiology equipment, where the IRS was satisfied that the interests
of the tax-exempt organization were adequately protected. 3
While caution should be exercised in this area, it appears at this
time that in the context of an exempt organization's participation
in a partnership with a non-exempt organization, the Service will
generally apply a so-called "facts and circumstances" test to deter-
mine whether such participation will threaten the tax-exempt sta-
tus of the former. The for-profit entity should not, of course, be
deriving any unreasonable benefits in the way of excessive salaries
or other prerequisites as a result of the exempt entity's contribu-
tions to the partnership. The investors in the partnership should
not be the same persons who control the tax-exempt entity. As-
suming further that the proprietary entity is receiving earnings
from the partnership strictly in proportion to its ownership inter-
est or investment, the Service will weigh the "incidental" benefit to
the proprietary entity derived from the exempt entity's capital
contributions to the partnership against the "public benefit" de-
rived from the exempt entity's pursuit of its exempt purposes
through the partnership structure. In addition to emphasizing the
special clinical and educational services of the partnership, the new
62. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7820058.
63. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8234029 (hospital's for-profit subsidiary, a general partner in
medical office building-"MOB"); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8217022, as amended by Priv. Ltr. Rul.
8226146(MOB); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8344099 (joint venture to purchase and operate a CAT Scan-
ner); See also Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 8206093, 8409102.
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corporation should be able to demonstrate that without joint ven-
turing with the proprietary company, it would not be able to pur-
sue the activity.
Of course, even if a tax-exempt status is obtained, to the extent
that the Service finds that the partnership business is unrelated to
the performance of the new corporation's exempt purposes, the in-
come would be treated as UBTI6 " If the UBTI were to constitute a
significant portion of the new corporation's income, its tax-exempt
status would be jeopardized.
Finally, where the partnership format is chosen as a vehicle to
provide certain tax benefits to individuals or the for-profit entity,
care must be exercised to avoid triggering the tax-exempt entity
leasing rules;6 5 and where a certain "tax shelter ratio" (computed
by comparing investments to deductions) will be generated and se-
curities issues raised, the tax shelter, be it a partnership or a cor-
poration, must register with the IRS. 6
E. Antitrust Issues
The recent increase of joint ventures in the health care industry
between potential competitors has made the industry more suscep-
tible to scrutiny under federal and state antitrust laws. In general,
every joint venture among horizontal competitors raises antitrust
risks, and the risks are significantly greater if the venture could
have some impact on prices charged by the participants or if the
participants have a dominant share in the market. For antitrust
purposes, a joint venture may be defined as "an integration of op-
erations between two or more separate firms, in which the follow-
ing conditions are present: (1) the enterprise is under the joint
control of the parent firms, which are not under related control; (2)
each parent makes a substantial contribution to the joint enter-
prise; (3) the enterprise exists as a business entity separate from
its parents; and (4) the joint venture creates significant new enter-
prise capability in terms of new productive capacity, new technol-
ogy, a new product, or entry into a new market. ' 67 A joint venture
may be a jointly owned corporation, but it is not necessary that
either the parents or the joint venture be corporations.
Joint ventures, in which separate entities combine their opera-
64. Rev. Rul. 68-376, 1968-2 C.B. 246; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7841061.
65. IR.C. § 168(0).
66. I.R.C. §§ 6111 and 6112.
67. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1523, 1526 (1982).
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tions to achieve limited purposes, could constitute a contract, com-
bination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act.68 Only some types of agreements in restraint
of trade have been found to be so anticompetitive in purpose or
effect that they have been denounced as "illegal per se", i.e. illegal
without inquiry into purpose, effect, or legitimate business justifi-
cation. Traditionally, courts have applied the per se rule to price
fixing arrangements69 and market division.70
Taking the example of alternative delivery systems in the con-
text of section 1 of the Sherman Act, provider controlled alterna-
tive delivery systems are particularly susceptible to an application
of the per se rule.7 1 Independent insurer or employer-sponsored al-
ternative delivery systems are not as susceptible to antitrust chal-
lenge because the non-provider controlled alternative delivery sys-
tem corporation can negotiate a fee schedule individually with
each provider, avoiding a horizontal arrangement among provid-
ers. 72 In order for a provider-sponsored alternative delivery system
to avoid the charge that individual providers are combining, con-
spiring, or contracting to fix prices, and to avoid the application of
the per se rule, in favor of the less stringent rule of reason,73 it
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). In the antitrust context, organization of the joint venture as a
corporation rather than as a partnership or a contractual relationship will make it less likely
that the joint venture itself constitutes a contract in restraint of trade in violation of section
1. The participants, to the extent that they may enter into anticompetitive agreements
within the context of the joint venture would be protected by the doctrine set forth in Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984) (a corporation cannot
conspire with its wholly owned subsidiary).
69. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (vertical maximum price fixing);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (horizontal maxi-
mum price fixing). See also Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959)
(group boycott).
70. E.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Some joint venture opera-
tions are actually a management tool for effecting market division. Market divisions can also
arise through competitors forming a joint venture that will only serve a specific territory,
such as a free-standing emergi-center relegated to a certain market.
71. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (per se rule
applied to invalidate a maximum fee schedule set by physicians).
72. Advisory Op., Health Care Management Assocs., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
22,036 (June 8, 1983).
73. Under the rule of reason, a court analyzes "the joint venture's structure, the con-
duct and intent of the venture's participants, and the resulting competitive effects to deter-
mine whether a transaction unlawfully restrains trade." Brodley, supra note 67, at 1535. In
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1093 (1980), the Second Circuit outlined more specific factors which might be the sub-
ject of a rule of reason analysis in determining whether a joint venture imposes an unreason-
able restraint on competition: "the size of the joint venturers; their share of their respective
markets; the contributions of each party to the venture and the benefits derived; the likeli-
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must ensure that the prices it arranges are the product of an arms-
length negotiation between the individual provider and a "negoti-
ating committee" of the board of directors of the alternative deliv-
ery system brokerage corporation which is composed of, or at least
dominated by, non-provider trustees or directors such as employ-
ers. This non-provider controlled negotiating committee should
have sole authority to arrange fees with participating providers,
thus precluding "any contract, combination or conspiracy" among
providers in restraint of trade.
7 4
A joint venture could also violate the prohibitions of section 2 of
the Sherman Act 75 against monopolies if concentration of market
power in the new entity were used to impede competition in the
field, or if monopoly in one market were used to create monopoly
in another market.7 The elements of an offense under section 2
are possession of monopoly power in a relevant market and the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior prod-
uct, business acumen, or historic accident. 77 Monopoly power, for
purposes of establishing an offense of monopolizing under section
2, is defined as power to control prices and exclude competition
with respect to a particular geographical market.78 If, for example,
a company providing traditional indemnity insurance for health
care benefits forms a health maintenance organization or a pre-
ferred provider organization, it might be leveraging its monopoly
power in the group insurance market to impede the development
of other alternative delivery systems, to exclude certain providers
from participating in its alternative delivery system and to control
hood that, in the absence of the joint effort, one or both parties would undertake a similar
project, either alone or with a smaller firm in the other market; the nature of the ancillary
restraints imposed and the reasonableness of their relationship to the purposes of the ven-
ture." 603 F.2d at 302.
74. See Glen Eden Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 555 F. Supp.
337 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (court declined to analyze under the per se rule a hospital reimburse-
ment committee established by Blue Cross which included hospital administrators.) Apply-
ing the rule of reason, the court stated that "[t]he ability of hospitals in the instant case to
veto recommended changes does not, without more, demonstrate concerted action in re-
straint of trade." Id. at 342. See also Federal Trade Commission enforcement statement
regarding physician agreements to control medical prepayment plans in 46 FED. REG. 48982
(October 5, 1981).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
76. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
77. See Borough of Lansdale v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 692 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1982).
78. Id. at 311.
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reimbursement prices to providers.79
Certain joint ventures might also be characterized under the an-
titrust laws as "tying arrangements." A tying arrangement, which
may be considered a per se violation of the Sherman Act, occurs
when (1) one party agrees to sell a product or service (the "tying
product") only if the buyer agrees to buy a second product or ser-
vice (the "tied product"); (2) the seller has sufficient economic
power with regard to the tying product to coerce purchase of the
tied product; (3) a substantial amount of commerce is involved;
and (4) the arrangement produces anticompetitive results in the
tied market.8 0 An example from the home health care field would
be an exclusive arrangement whereby a home health care affiliate
provided care only to patients discharged from its hospital affiliate.
A plaintiff could probably show the existence of two products but
might not be able to justify application of the per se standard
which would presumably require a showing that the seller of the
tying product (home health care) had sufficient economic power to
force purchase of the tied product (hospital care).8 1 In the absence
of such market power, a rule of reason analysis would probably
apply.
Less likely, but still possible, would be a challenge on the basis
that services were "tied" to products. For example, all patients re-
ceiving home care from a hospital affiliate might be provided with
TPN products from a certain supplier with whom the hospital af-
filiate had an exclusive contract. An on-going case which alleges
unlawful tying is being litigated in Ohio federal district court
against Timken Mercy Medical Center, which allegedly had con-
tracts with a nursing home and a VNA, which constituted a tying
arrangement.8 2 To reduce the risk of attack under a tying theory,
one type of health care provider, such as a hospital, should not tie
its services to those of another. Furthermore, if the provider has
market power over the provision of one service or product, it must
be cautious about combining that service or product with the sale
of another service or product. The level of competition, barriers to
competition, and the existence of potential plaintiffs would all be
relevant.
Joint ventures in the home health care industry may run afoul of
79. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 548 F. Supp. 1048 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
80. See, e.g., Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th
Cir. 1981).
81. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
82. Rudner v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., No. 84-998 A (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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the Robinson Patman Price Discrimination Act.83 The Robinson
Patman Act, amending the Clayton Act in 1936,84 made it unlawful
in most instances for one engaged in commerce to discriminate in
price between purchasers of like commodities where, among other
things, the effect would be to injure competition.85 The Nonprofit
Institutions Act, enacted in 1938, exempted from the Robinson
Patman Act "purchases of supplies for their own use by schools
.. . hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for
profit. '86 Based on this defense to the Robinson Patman Act, many
hospitals, for example, purchase supplies, such as pharmaceuticals,
at favorable prices, for use in connection with or resale to their
patients. A hospital may contemplate a similar strategy in connec-
tion with a joint venture. For example, a hospital may contemplate
entering a joint venture in home care, directly or through a subsid-
iary, with the joint venture supplying pharmaceuticals, purchased
at discount, to patients in their homes. If all parties in the venture
are nonprofit, the analysis might proceed along the lines of Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Association.
87
In Abbott, it was not disputed that the pharmaceutical manufac-
turer sold its products to Portland hospitals at prices lower than it
charged commercial pharmacies for the same products.8 The hos-
pitals then dispensed the medications to a variety of individuals,
whom the court, in analyzing the case, grouped into a number of
categories. 89
In general, the court concluded that the Nonprofit Institutions
Act exemption was a limited one and would not automatically
cover all hospital purchases. The "test" would be whether the
purchases were for use by the hospital "in the sense that such use
is a part of and promotes the hospital's intended institutional op-
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982). The Robinson-Patman Act applies only to the sale
of commodities. There are not many health care joint ventures aside from those in the home
health care industry selling commodities.
84. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526
(1936).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1982) (originally enacted as Act of May 26, 1938, ch. 283, 52 Stat.
446).
87. 425 U.S. 1 (1976) (the more recent case of Jefferson County Pharmaceuticals Ass'n
v. Abbott Laboratories, 103 S. Ct. 1011 (1983), was directed toward the purchase and resale
of pharmaceuticals by government entities. However, the case did reaffirm the heavy pre-
sumption against exemptions to the antitrust laws). See also De Modena v. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan, Inc., 743 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1230 (1985).
88. 425 U.S. at 6.
89. Id. at 9-10.
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eration in the care of persons who are its patients."90
More specifically, the court found that categories 1-3 (sales to
inpatients, for use in their treatment in the hospital; to patients
admitted to the emergency room, for use in their treatment in the
emergency room; and to outpatients for their personal use on the
hospital premises) were clearly for the hospital's own use.91 Cate-
gories 4 and 5 (sales to inpatients and to emergency room patients
upon discharge for personal use off the premises, and to outpa-
tients for personal use off the premises), to the extent they encom-
passed "genuine take-home prescriptions" intended to continue
and/or supplement for a limited reasonable time treatment admin-
istered to patients at the hospital, were also for the hospital's own
use. However, a refill of a take-home prescription was not for the
hospital's own use.2
According to the court, the final two relevant categories, sales to
staff physicians for dispensation in their private practice and sales
to walk-in customers, were further from the hospital's own use. In
particular, extension of the exemption to the walk-in customer, in
the absence of an emergency, would convert the hospital pharmacy
into "just another community drug store" with an unfair advan-
tage over competing community pharmacies.93 The court refused to
adopt a physical line of demarcation at the hospital's door, but
looked instead to the hospital's continued participation in the
medical supervision and treatment begun at the hospital. 4
The court concluded that additional recordkeeping would be
necessary if the hospital dispensed in any non-exempt circum-
stances, since appropriate price adjustments would be required.
5
Justice Marshall, concurring in the opinion of the court, stated
that in his view, the purpose of the "own use" limitation was to
prevent nonprofit institutions from taking advantage of the anti-
trust exemption by buying supplies at low cost in order to resell
them at a profit.96 While Congress was interested in helping chari-
table institutions by lowering their expenses, it did not intend to
help them indirectly, at the expense of competition, by giving them
90. Id. at 14.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 15.
93. Id. at 18.
94. Id. at 15.
95. Id. at 20.
96. Id. at 22 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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the means to raise money. 7
In De Modena v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,9a the
court broadly defined the term charitable institution and found
that it encompassed the Kaiser Health Plan, an HMO. 9 The court
then rejected the wholesale application of the Abbott categories to
an HMO, choosing instead to determine the basic institutional
function of the health plan and to decide which sales were in keep-
ing with this function. Because an HMO provides continuing and
often preventive health care for its members, any sale of drugs to a
member falls within the basic function of the HMO. 100
Based on the "own use" analysis in Abbott and in De Modena, it
is possible that sales to home care patients by a charitable home
care corporation could be characterized as for its "own use." The
strength of the argument would depend on the extent to which the
new entity had as its charitable purpose the provision of continu-
ing care to patients in their homes. While an antitrust challenge,
based in part on the Robinson Patman Act, has been mounted
against a provider of home hyperalimentation, the provider was a
hospital which had not traditionally been characterized as serving
home patients.0 However, while arguably a charitable home care
corporation might be found to be entitled to the Nonprofit Institu-
tion Act exemption, based on the policy arguments articulated in
the two cases noted above, it is unlikely that the exemption would
extend to sales by a partnership, formed between a for-profit and a
not-for-profit entity, even if the sales were to individuals charac-
terized as patients of the partnership. Therefore, this issue and its
economic ramifications for the venture should be considered care-
fully with the proposed venturers prior to implementation of the
venture.
If the venture can qualify as a joint venture for antitrust pur-
poses it will be judged under a more lenient standard. The Su-
preme Court in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society"0 2
noted that the foundation in that case, whose price fixing it con-
demned as a per se violation of the Sherman Act, was not "analo-
gous to partnerships or other joint arrangements in which persons
97. Id. at 22-23 (Marshall, J., concurring).
98. 743 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1230 (1985).
99. Id. at 1392.
100. Id. at 1392-93.
101. Home Parenteral Care, Inc. v. Sisters of St. Joseph Peace, No. 84-144 (D. Ore.
1984).
102. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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would otherwise pool their capital and share the risks of loss as
well as the opportunities for profit."'10 3 The Court added that "in
such joint ventures the partnership is regarded as a single firm
competing with other sellers in the market."'
10 4
Perhaps the most important characteristic of a joint venture for
antitrust purposes is the creation of a new producing organiza-
tion.105 Providers, for instance, cannot simply join together and call
themselves a joint venture in order to escape a per se evaluation
under the antitrust laws without creating some new productive ca-
pacity. In Maricopa, the Supreme Court noted that the combina-
tion of physicians in the form of a foundation which sets prices did
not permit them "to sell any different product." 06 In Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,10 7 the Supreme Court held
that labelling a project a "joint venture" which "perhaps every
agreement and combination could be so labelled" would not shield
allegedly unlawful activity from antitrust condemnation.
108
Therefore, for example, a provider-sponsored PPO must con-
vince a court that its PPO brokerage corporation is really a new
and distinct entity and that individual providers would not enter
the market unless they could organize the, joint venture/PPO bro-
kerage corporation for purposes of risk spreading. The PPO
"whole" must be "truly greater than the sum of its parts," and
must be a "different product."'1 9 A provider would argue that the
PPO provides a unique and effective system of coordinated health
care delivery at a time when public concern over spiraling health
costs is intense. Coordination of managerial expertise, development
of the right mix of professional participation and a consistent utili-
zation review mechanism, as well as a fuller integration of physi-
cian and hospital interests and shared risk taking, will increase
both the consumer benefit and competitive advantage of the PPO.
F. Employee Benefit Plans: Internal Revenue Code Compliance
Joint ventures can have significant consequences for employee
benefits. The tax-favored status of many employee benefit plans,
e.g., pension, profit-sharing, self-insured medical reimbursement,
103. Id. at 356.
104. Id.
105. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 169 (1964).
106. 457 U.S. at 356.
107. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
108. Id. at 598.
109. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1979).
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cafeteria and funded welfare plans, depends on demonstrating that
the benefits of such plans do not unduly discriminate in favor of
officers, shareholders or highly compensated employees." ° In test-
ing whether impermissible discrimination exists, the employees of
affiliated employers are treated as employed by a single employer
and leased employees are treated as employed by the recipient of
their services."' In addition, tax-qualified pension and profit-shar-
ing plans must include special provisions (including minimum ben-
efit or contribution rules and often accelerated vesting), if more
than sixty percent of the benefits are earned by officers and certain
shareholder-employees (so-called "top-heavy" plans)." In deter-
mining whether a particular plan is top-heavy, benefits and contri-
butions under certain other plans of the employer and of any affili-
ated employers must be aggregated."
3
The affiliation of employers will not necessarily lead to the dis-
qualification of the employee benefit plans of the affiliated employ-
ers or limit the opportunity of affiliated employers to establish new
plans. Nevertheless, demonstrating satisfaction of the non-discrim-
ination standards is more complex when employers are affiliated.
Employers may be limited as to the type and amount of tax-fa-
vored benefits they may offer their employees by the need to sat-
isfy the non-discrimination standards on an aggregate basis. The
effect of affiliation on the top-heavy determination is more difficult
to predict and may be either helpful or injurious, depending on the
precise facts. In any case, however, plan amendments may be re-
quired to ensure the plans properly reflect the existence of affili-
ated employers.
Two or more trades or businesses will be deemed affiliated if
(i) one organization owns at least 80% of another organization or
(ii) the same five or fewer individuals, estates or trusts own, in aggregate
(a) at least 80% of two or more organizations, and
(b) more than 50% of such organizations, taking into account for
this purpose only the smallest interest of each individual, estate or
trust in each such organization.
The trades or businesses which may be affiliated under this rule
include, but may not be limited to, corporations (based on voting
rights or value), partnerships (based on capital or profits interests),
110. See generally I.R.C. §§ 105(h), 125, 401, 410 and 505.
111. I.R.C. §§ 414(b), (c), (m) and (n).
112. See I.R.C. § 416.
113. I.R.C. § 416(c)(2).
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trusts (based on actuarial interests) and sole proprietorships. 1 4 In
addition, certain attribution rules apply which may cause interests
owned by one person or entity to be treated as owned by another
person or entity."1
5
Two or more organizations will also be deemed to be affiliated if
the organizations constitute an affiliated service group.11 Gener-
ally, the formation of an affiliated service group requires a degree
of cross-ownership similar to that described above (but with con-
siderably lower thresholds) and also that one organization regu-
larly perform services for the other organization in providing ser-
vices to third parties. No cross-ownership is required, however, if
the principal business of one organization is the performance of
management services for another, or another and related,
organizations.
An individual providing services to an organization (the "recipi-
ent") who is not otherwise an employee of the recipient under
common law principles may nevertheless be treated as an em-
ployee of the recipient if he has performed services for the recipi-
ent, of a type historically performed by employees in the business
field of the recipient, on a substantially full-time basis for a period
of at least one year pursuant to an agreement between the recipi-
ent and any other person. '17 Such an individual will not be treated
as a leased employee, however, if the leasing organization covers
the individual under a money purchase pension plan which pro-
vides immediate participation, full and immediate vesting and an
employer contribution rate of at least 71/2 % (determined without
taking account of the employer's Social Security contributions)., 8
G. Labor and Employment Matters
The entering of a joint venture also raises questions under the
federal labor laws. The principal issue will be, once again, whether
the contracting parties, or the entity they create, may properly be
viewed as separate employers, or whether they will constitute a
single employer for purposes of these laws as well.
114. Proposed Treas. Reg. 1.414(c)-2.
115. Proposed Treas. Reg. 1.414(c)-4.
116. I.R.C. § 414(m).
117. I.R.C. § 414(n)(2).
118. I.R.C. § 414(n)(5).
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1. Fair Labor Standards Act
The federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 '19 provides for the
payment of minimum wages to non-exempt employees.12 It also
prohibits employers from employing any such employee for a
workweek longer than 40 hours "unless such employee receives
compensation for his employment in excess of [40] hours at a rate
not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is
employed.""1 ' The Department of Labor has taken the position
that an employee's work for two or more entities during the same
workweek must be aggregated for purposes of these minimum wage
and overtime provisions where (1) there is an arrangement between
the entities to share the employee's services, (2) one of the entities
is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the other entity (or
entities) in relation to the employee, or (3) the entities are not
completely disassociated with respect to the employment of the
employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee,
directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one of them con-
trols, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other
entity. 122
Under the Department's regulations, an employee who performs
services for more than one of the entities participating in a joint
venture may be deemed to be working for a single employer so that
the employee's total hours and compensation must be aggregated
for purposes of determining (1) the employee's regular rate of pay
and (2) both entities' compliance with the minimum wage and
overtime provisions. As one court stated:
[Wihere an employee works for two or more employers during the same
workweek pursuant to an arrangement between such employers for the in-
terchange of the employee, or if one company controls, is controlled by, or is
under common control with, directly or indirectly, the other company, the
entire employment must be considered as a whole for the purposes of the
Act and the employers are joint employers and each is jointly liable for the
full amount of underpayments irrespective of what portion of the joint em-
ployment may have been performed for each joint employer.123
The term "employer" is defined in the Act as including: "any per-
son acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
119. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1976).
122. 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (1985).
123. Mitchell v. Thompson Materials & Construction Co., 12 Wage & Hour Cas.
(BNA) 367, 369 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
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relation to an employer."'1 4
Several courts have held that, under this definition, personal lia-
bility may be imposed on the officers and directors of an employer
for minimum wage or overtime pay violations regardless of whether
fraud or some other basis for disregarding the corporate form is
shown. 2 5 The only test to be applied is whether the person on
whom liability is sought to be imposed was actively engaged in the
management, supervision, and oversight of the corporation's
operations.
26
2. National Labor Relations Act
Multiple business entities may also be deemed to constitute a
"single employer" for purposes of the National Labor Relations
Act (the NLRA).127 The NLRA guarantees to employees the right
to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection
128
and also provides for the election of bargaining representatives in
appropriate bargaining units. 29 The National Labor Relations
Board (the Board), which has the responsibility to administer the
Act, has generally considered four factors to determine whether
two or more companies should be treated as a single employer: (1)
functional interrelation of operations; (2) centralized control of la-
bor relations; (3) common management; and (4) common owner-
ship or financial control. 130 Common control of labor relations has
been described as the most critical factor to a determination that a
single employer exists,' 3 ' while common ownership is the least
important. 32
124. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1976).
125. E.g., Marchak v. Observer Publications, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 278, 282 (D.R.I. 1980);
Schultz v. Chalk-Fitzgerald Construction Co., 309 F. Supp. 1255, 1257 (D. Mass. 1970).
126. Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1983).
127. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
130. E.g., Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast Services
of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam); quoted with approval in South Praire
Construction Co. v. Local 627, International Union of Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800,
802 n.3 (1976).
131. See, e.g., Soule Glass & Glazing Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 792, 794 (1979), enforced in
part, 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981).
132. Cf. United Telegraph Workers v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 827 (1978) ("Because common ownership is necessarily a feature of any con-
glomerate organization, and because common ownership is not determinative where common
control is not shown, the Board held that the Union failed to demonstrate that [a holding
company and five subsidiaries] were a single employer").
Vol. 24:455
Joint Venture Issues
A determination that a single employer exists for purposes of the
NLRA can have numerous implications for the labor relations of
the various entities. In the first place, it will affect the scope of
potential bargaining units. For example, a typical bargaining unit
is generally limited by the Board to those employees of an em-
ployer who have the requisite "community of interests.' 1 33 Where,
however, two or more entities are properly considered a single em-
ployer for purposes of the Act, the scope of the potential bargain-
ing unit-and any election designated for the unit-may include
the employees of all the related entities.13 4 In some circumstances,
this might work to the advantage of the entities engaged in a joint
venture because it is normally easier for a union to organize a
smaller group of employees than a larger group. At the same time,
by insisting on the larger unit, the entities may avoid the prospect
of having to deal with numerous unions and bargaining units.'35
On the other hand, if one or more of the entities participating in
a joint venture is already organized, the Board may find that an
"accretion" to the preexisting bargaining unit has occurred when
the joint venture is established. Under these circumstances, the
previously unorganized entity may be obligated to observe the
terms of any existing collective bargaining agreement or to bargain
with the union representing the preexisting unit over the terms of
a new agreement.' Generally, the Board has looked to the follow-
ing factors to determine whether an accretion to an existing bar-
gaining unit has occurred: (1) degree of interchange among em-
ployees, (2) geographical proximity of new operation, (3)
integration of operations, (4) functional integration, (5) centralized
control of administration, (6) similarity of working conditions,
skills and functions, (7) common control over labor relations, (8)
collective bargaining history, and (9) number of employees at the
new or acquired facility compared with those in the bargaining
unit at existing operation.
3 7
133. 1950 NLRB Ann. Rep. 39 (1951) (In resolving the unit issue, "the Board's pri-
mary concern is to group together only employees who have substantial mutual interests in
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment").
134. E.g., Blumenfeld Theatres Circuit, 240 N.L.R.B. 206, 216 (1979).
135. Congress has recognized the problems that would be created by a proliferation of
bargaining units in the health care field. See Vicksburg Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d
1070, 1075 (5th Cir. 1981).
136. See, e.g., Texlite, Inc., 46 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1264 (1960); Continental Can Co., 127
N.L.R.B. 286 (1960).




In addition to these representation issues, if a single employer is
found to exist, each of the entities participating in a joint venture
may be held liable for the other's violations of the NLRA. 13 At the
same time, each of the entities may be denied the protection of the
secondary boycott provisions contained in the NLRA. These provi-
sions make it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to
threaten or coerce any employer for the purpose of forcing it to
cease doing business with any other employer.139 Under these pro-
visions, a labor union having a dispute with one employer cannot
picket or strike another employer with which it has no dispute in
order to coerce or induce the other employer to put pressure on the
first employer with which the labor organization does have a dis-
pute. If, however, the two entities are properly regarded as a single
employer for purposes of the Act, the secondary boycott provisions
db not apply and the union is free to strike or picket either of the
entities in order to achieve its purpose. 40
3. Anti-Discrimination Statutes
In some circumstances, multiple entities may also be deemed to
be a single employer for purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,1 1 which prohibits discrimination against employees
on the basis of their race, color, sex, religion, or national origin."4
In general, courts have applied the tests for single employer status
developed by the National Labor Relations Board to Title VII
cases. 143 As under the NLRA, the consequence of a finding of sin-
gle employer status may be that one of the entities participating in
a joint venture may be held liable for the unlawful acts of another
one of the entities.' 4 ' This result is particularly likely when an of-
ficer or agent of the entity personally directed or participated in
138. See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030, 1043 (8th Cir. 1976)
(affirming Board treatment of a wholly owned subsidiary and its parent corporation as a
single entity because the parent possessed the present and apparent means to exercise con-
trol in matters of labor negotiations even though the day-to-day labor relations matters were
not under the parent's control).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
140. See Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1212, 1213-14 (1980) (discuss-
ing the development of the "single-employer" branch of the ally doctrine in secondary boy-
cott cases).
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
143. See Mas Marques v. Digital Equipment Corp., 637 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1980).
144. E.g., Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 1977).
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the allegedly unlawful action of the other entity.14 5
H. Compliance with Securities Laws
Joint ventures organized as limited partnerships or corporations
will raise securities laws issues.1 4 6 Unless an exemption applies, any
offer or sale of a security must be registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.1 47 Typically, ownership of a stock or
investment as a limited partner will involve the owner in the own-
ership of a "security" because the investment is premised on a rea-
sonable expectation of profits and the profits are to be derived
from the efforts of others. Since registering with the SEC might be
very expensive and therefore prohibitive in the context of a smaller
joint venture, it is very important to obtain an exemption. The
principal federal exemption available is under section 3(a)(11) of
the Securities Act of 1933148 and Rule 147 adopted thereunder
which offer an exemption for intrastate offerings. The require-
ments for this exemption include the following:
1. the issuer is a resident of the state in which the offering is to occur;
2. the issuer's business is genuinely local (to that state) in character;
3. all the proceeds of the offering are to be used within that state;
4. all offerees or purchasers are residents of that state;
5. the securities offered pursuant to the exemption come to rest in the
hands of persons in that state; and
6. the entire issue of securities is offered and sold in such an intrastate ex-
empt transaction.
1 49
Three limited offering exemptions are also available under regu-
lation D.150 Rule 504151 involves an offering of $500,000 or less with
no limit on the number of offerees or purchasers. Rule 505152 in-
volves an offering of up to $5,000,000 where there are not more
than 35 purchasers and an unlimited number of "accredited inves-
145. See, e.g., Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181, 1183-84
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); EEOC v. Upjohn Corp., 445 F. Supp. 635, 638 (N.D. Ga. 977).
146. For securities purposes, a general partnership can be characterized as an invest-
ment contract if there is an investment of money in a common enterprise with an expecta-
tion of profits coming from the efforts of other parties. More particularly, if a general part-
ner is passive, an investment contract may be created and the securities laws may be
applicable. On the other hand, if all the general partners contribute to these efforts, then
the securities laws should not be applicable.
147. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(ii) (1982).
149. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1985).
150. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-230.506 (1985).
151. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1985).
152. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1985).
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tors.' '11 3 Rule 50611" has no dollar limitation but there must not be
more than 35 non-accredited investors-all of whom have knowl-
edge and expertise in financial and business matters so that they
are capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the invest-
ment-and an unlimited number of accredited investors. Under
Regulation D, general solicitation and advertising are prohibited,
securities issued are, with one exception, restricted as to resale,'
specific disclosure requirements are (except in the case of a Rule
504 offering) imposed and a notice filing on Form D151 is required
to be made. In addition, the distinct requirements of "Blue Sky"




Although the legal issues created by a joint venture can be com-
plex, they typically can be surmounted. The major difficulty may
instead be in the financial feasibility of a given project. Before in-
volving lawyers in the project, it is prudent to conduct a thorough
feasibility study so that the joint venture proves to be a unifying
rather than a divisive vehicle, particularly when the participants
are hospitals and physicians.
153. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (1985).
154. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1985).
155. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (1985).
156. 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (1985).
157. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-230.506 (1985) (Regulation D preliminary notes).
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